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INTRODUCTION
May 29, 2002, was a day that started like so many others for the
average American commuter. Wake up, shower, eat breakfast, and
perhaps glance at the stories in the morning’s paper. But on this
morning the shocking headline read “Congress Threatens to Leave
1
D.C. Unless New Capitol is Built,” certainly a surprising piece of
journalism from the New York Times or Washington Post, but not from
2
The Onion, one of today’s most well-known satirical publications.
Since The Onion’s humble beginnings as a “fake news” newspaper at
the University of Wisconsin, it has rapidly found popularity and
3
success on both the Internet and in print, and is just one of the many
examples of cultural satire that can be found in practically every
4
available expressive medium.
The majority of Americans who read The Onion article reporting
that Congress was threatening to leave Washington unless a new
5
Capitol was built likely recognized it as a clear satire of both the
penchant of sports teams to demand new stadiums and the potential
6
fickleness of some of the fans who follow them. However, this was
not understood by the official news service of the People’s Republic
of China, which reported the story as fact after it was lifted from The
7
Onion’s website by a staff reporter.
1. Congress Threatens to Leave D.C. Unless New Capitol is Built, THE ONION, May 29,
2002,
http://www.theonion.com/content/node/27828
[hereinafter
Congress
Threatens to Leave D.C.].
2. Geoff Keighley, The Onion: Funny Site is No Joke, CNN.COM, Aug. 29, 2003, htt
p://edition.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/08/28/bus2.feat.onion.site/index.html.
3. See id. (reporting the profitability and continued expansion of The Onion).
4. See Sam Schechner, Press ‘Play’ for Satire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007, at W3
(noting that the satirical news genre occupied by The Onion and “The Daily Show” is
becoming increasingly competitive).
5. Congress Threatens to Leave D.C., supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Jessica Kowal, As Sonics Pack to Leave Town, Seattle Shrugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2006, at A20, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/13/news/se
attle.php (discussing the possible move of the NBA’s Seattle Supersonics to
Oklahoma City after Seattle voters rejected a ballot measure providing subsidies for a
new arena); see also MAJOR LEAGUE (Mirage 1989) (lambasting the desire of owners to
move sports teams to newer stadiums in profitable cities via a comedic movie about
the threatened relocation of the Cleveland Indians baseball team).
7. Henry Chu, Reeled in by a Spoof, Chinese Daily Shrugs Off Its Capitol Error, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 2002, at A3.
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While the article published by The Onion seemed harmless, and the
confusion that it caused was merely amusing, it potentially ran afoul
of trademark law, exposing the editors of the paper to a possible
8
infringement action. Trademark law is designed to protect the
consumer against confusion in the marketplace by ensuring that
goods and services are readily identifiable and not mistaken for other
9
products. Thus, because the satirical comment published by The
Onion not only created consumer confusion, but also referenced
10
possible trademarks such as the Capitol, C-SPAN, and Pac Bell, it
11
was left open to a potential infringement suit. Although it would
almost certainly be considered to be protected expression because of
12
the political and editorial nature of its content, the fact that the
article could still be the subject of costly litigation demonstrates the
uncertainty that currently surrounds the free use of trademarks in
13
creative works.
This uncertainty that exists in the world of trademarks stems largely
from a distinction in copyright law between parody and satire that has
14
been incorporated into trademark doctrine.
Copyright law has
declared that a parody that borrows from a prior work is worthy of
15
First Amendment protection, whereas a satire is not. Lower courts
in search of a workable standard for trademark parody and satire
16
have since adopted and applied this framework, a worrisome
8. See infra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (explaining why an
infringement suit against The Onion, while possible, would be unlikely to succeed).
9. See infra Part I.A (explaining the traditional roles of trademark law and the
basis for infringement actions based on consumer confusion).
10. Congress Threatens to Leave D.C., supra note 1.
11. Symbols such as the Capitol can be considered trademarks under the
Lanham Act as codified in the definition of a trademark in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
12. See Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark,
and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924–25 (1985) (noting
the powerful historical significance of satire as a political force deserving of
protection). Even courts that are the most restrictive of trademark speech have held
that editorial content in traditional media is given constitutional protection. See Mut.
of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (observing that the
court’s decision to prohibit the use of a trademark to make a satirical comment on a
t-shirt does not affect the defendant’s ability to “present an editorial parody in a
book, magazine, or film” under the First Amendment).
13. See discussion infra Part II.A (examining four cases involving trademark satire
and parody, three of which found that the defendants’ work was not protected and
was instead unlawful infringement).
14. See infra Part I.B (tracing the development of the parody/satire distinction
and its inclusion into trademark law).
15. The Supreme Court determined parody to be that which needs to use an
earlier work in order to make a comment directly on that work, while satire does not
share the same need, as it comments on larger aspects of society. Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). For a full discussion on the Campbell
case and the parody/satire distinction, see discussion infra Part I.B.
16. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999)
(reasoning that the Campbell distinction must be applied in a case involving
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development that only serves to limit the creative uses of trademarks,
which should be constitutionally recognized as free speech. This
continued reliance on copyright law is detrimental because copyright
is primarily focused on protecting artists from infringement and
17
rewarding them for their expressions, making it reasonable to limit
the lawful borrowing of their works to parody. Conversely, trademark
law protects the consumer, and companies that register trademarks
are engaging the public in a dialogue that is more akin to
commercial speech, which the Supreme Court has held subject to
additional regulation, unlike the more traditional forms of political
18
or creative expression. Therefore, while copyright law protects an
artist who has participated in the highest form of First Amendment
speech, trademarks are a more commercial embodiment of speech
that only ensures that the consuming public is free of confusion.
These divergent goals separate trademark and copyright, and so
while copyright perhaps needs the distinction between parody and
satire to prevent unlawful infringement, it is a burdensome limitation
in trademark law that only serves to potentially chill otherwise valid
speech like the stories found on the pages of The Onion.
This Comment seeks to remove the tension that the parody/satire
distinction creates in trademark law by proving that the principles
behind trademark protection allow famous marks to be more widely
used in expressive satiric works. This can be easily accomplished if
courts expand the test established by the Second Circuit that balances
the interests of the consumer in avoiding confusion with those of the
public in promoting free speech. Part I examines the definition of a
trademark, the distinction between parody and satire in copyright law
and its application to trademark infringement cases, and finally
explains the current form of the Second Circuit balancing test.
Part II begins with an illustration of the inherent limitations of the
Second Circuit test as currently applied through an examination of
trademark parody); see also infra Part I.B (tracing the origins of the parody/satire
distinction and its inclusion into trademark law).
17. See infra notes 150–155 (examining the goals of copyright law and the
protections that it provides).
18. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) (concluding that because commercial transactions have long been
subject to regulation, the First Amendment grants “lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”). In regulating
commercial speech, the state does not have to identify and enact the least restrictive
statute, but rather need only find a “‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.” Bd. of Trs. of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
480 (1989) (citation omitted). Thus, while there are still many constitutional
safeguards that ensure some protection for commercial speech, it is one of the more
regulated forms of speech.
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four examples from recent case law. Part II then continues by
explaining the justifications for protecting the expressive satire of
famous trademarks: the nature and goals of trademark law, especially
when compared to that of copyright in light of the parody/satire
distinction, and the way that established trademarks are inexorably
intertwined with modern society. Part III establishes why the
expansion of the Second Circuit test to include the expressive satire
19
of famous trademarks is desirable through an application of the
expanded test to the previous examples of satire and parody. Finally,
this comment concludes by showing that it is indeed possible to
permit the use of famous trademarks in the time-honored setting of
satire while still protecting trademark owners against the
misappropriation of their marks.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Definition of a Trademark and Classic Infringement
According to the Lanham Act, which regulates the registration and
use of trademarks, a trademark is defined as any “word, name,
symbol, or device” that is used to “identify and distinguish . . . goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
20
others and to indicate the source of the goods.” Trademarks have
been used in commerce for as long as humans have engaged in the
21
act of trading, buying, and selling goods. Thus, such marks have
always been, and continue to be, important facets of economic
transactions, as they allow consumers to quickly and easily identify the
22
quality and origin of products. In the United States, businesses used
common law to protect such marks until the first federal trademark
23
law was enacted by Congress in 1870.
Although it was quickly
determined that this early statute was unable to keep pace with the

19. That is, so long as the defendant’s work is not in direct competition with the
plaintiff’s trademark. See infra note 200 (explaining how the expanded test would
still protect against infringement when the newer, or junior, mark is used by a
defendant in direct competition with the older, or senior, mark).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
21. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:1 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the origins of symbols as trademarks);
see also Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK
REP. 265, 270–71 (1975) (noting that ancient lamps have been found bearing marks
used to indicate source of origin and that approximately 1000 different potters’
marks were used during the Roman Empire).
22. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 617 (4th ed. 2006).
23. Id. at 618.
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24

demands of a growing commercial society, it was not until 1946 that
the modern form of trademark regulation came into being with the
25
passage of the Lanham Act. Envisioned as a necessary response to
the failures of prior trademark legislation, the Lanham Act did not
26
move swiftly from its birth to eventual passage. Indeed, it took years
for supporters of the Lanham Act to overcome concerns that it
created monopoly rights for companies and favored large
corporations.
Eventually, however, the overriding need for a
standardized system of trademark registration and protection
27
triumphed.
Companies use trademarks to ensure that their goods are distinct
from those of their competitors and are recognized by the consumer
28
as being of a certain quality. Thus, trademarks permeate modern
society. Some trademarks have gone beyond their original purpose of
identifying the source of products, and instead provide a new and
evolving vocabulary that elevates them to the status of a celebrity or
29
cultural icon. As such, famous trademarks are often used by those
24. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:3 (explaining that early federal trademark
laws were not able to cope with the expanding use of marks, as registrations were
perpetual and the owner was not required to maintain the mark’s stature as an actual
trademark). The original 1870 federal trademark law was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court as a violation of the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (finding that a
trademark, unlike an expression or invention protected by a copyright or patent,
contains no element of discovery). The Copyright and Patent Clause is the source of
Congress’s power to establish both copyright and patent regulations. See U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the right “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
25. The most recent enactment of the Lanham Act is codified beginning at 15
U.S.C. § 1051. Unlike copyright and patent law, and due to the Trade-Mark Cases,
statutory trademark regulations are grounded in the power given to Congress by the
Commerce Clause. See 1 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRACTICE § 1.04 (release no. 39, 1998) (citing the various legal grounds for
trademark protection). The Commerce Clause permits Congress “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26. The Lanham Act traces its origins to 1920, more than twenty years before it
was signed into law. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:4. While it was originally
introduced in 1938, the intervening events of World War II caused the passage of the
Lanham Act to be delayed until after the war came to an end. Id.
27. See id. (acknowledging the concerns of the Justice Department that the
Lanham Act would hamper their antitrust efforts at the time).
28. See id. § 3:2 (listing the four functions of trademarks as (1) identifying and
distinguishing the goods of a seller, (2) signifying that the goods are coming from a
single source, (3) showing that all of the goods with the mark are of an equal quality,
and (4) allowing for efficient use in advertising).
29. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 965 (1993)
(observing that certain trademarks have “worked their way into the English
language”). Judge Kozinski sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, is a leading commentator in trademark law, and wrote the majority opinion
in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally Steven
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30

who are not the true owner of the mark. When a mark is borrowed
in this fashion, the owner of the trademark turns to the statutory
protections of the Lanham Act, which bars any unauthorized use of a
31
mark that is likely to cause consumer confusion.
There are two ways that the owner of a trademark can seek
damages for unlawful infringement under federal law: the traditional
32
likelihood of confusion analysis or by invoking the newer remedies
33
provided by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 (“FTDA”).
While the enactment of the FTDA both revolutionized trademark law
and raised concerns regarding its potentially devastating impact on
34
free speech, this comment will focus solely on the effects that the
original basis for trademark infringement—the consumer’s
likelihood of confusion—has on satirical expressions.
To determine whether the unauthorized use of a trademark rises to
the level of infringement, section 1114 of the Lanham Act states that
35
if the use is “likely to cause confusion,” then it is unlawful. Thus, if
the consumer will be confused as to the source of a product, good, or
service when confronted with the established (“senior”) mark and the
newer (“junior”) mark, courts will find that the junior mark infringes
36
upon the senior. In the absence of a clear Supreme Court ruling on
the issue, each circuit has developed its own set of factors to evaluate
M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, The Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the
Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 599 (1998) (arguing that freedom of expression demands more protection for
the appropriation of trademarks that have become cultural icons).
30. See Dorsen, supra note 12, at 939 (noting that trademarks are a “natural
target” of those who wish to comment on our national culture); Sarah Mayhew
Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee: The Chilling Effect of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 959 (2001)
(determining that holders of famous trademarks, such as large companies, are
“inevitably involved in public debate,” and so their trademarks are naturally drawn
into this debate as well).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
32. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (Supp. 2007). The dilution remedies provided by the
FTDA allow the holder of a famous trademark to secure injunctive relief when an
unauthorized use “impairs the distinctiveness” of the mark or causes it harm due to
an unfavorable or lewd association. Id. This permits the holders of such marks to
control their use even when no source of origin confusion exists. See Schlosser, supra
note 30, at 933–34 (discussing how the FTDA provides relief regardless of
competition, likelihood of confusion, or bad faith).
34. See, e.g., Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution and Speech: First Amendment
Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 547, 548 (2004)
(arguing that the FTDA does not adequately protect First Amendment issues because
it abandons the societal interest of guarding against consumer confusion).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b) (2000).
36. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding
infringement because the junior trademark (“Sleekcraft”) would create source of
origin confusion when compared to the senior mark (“Slickcraft”)).
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37

when consumer confusion exists. However, these different factors
38
are all variations of the same basic test, and are well illustrated by
39
the Ninth Circuit in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats. The Sleekcraft court
recognized eight factors that contribute to the examination of a
likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the trademark, (2) the
proximity in nature of the goods being sold, (3) the similarities of the
trademarks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) the marketing
channels used, (6) the type of good and the degree of care exercised
by the consumer, (7) the defendant’s intent in using the mark, and
40
(8) the likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
In any
trademark infringement claim, a court will use similar factors to
determine whether the defendant has infringed upon the plaintiff’s
mark. Although courts have applied this likelihood of confusion
analysis to trademark infringement cases that involve parody and
41
satire, courts and commentators alike have discussed the fact that
the test was originally designed only for commercial situations and
42
not those that raise First Amendment concerns.
Despite this
limitation, because the likelihood of confusion test continues to
underscore the analysis of satire and parody in trademark cases, it
must remain in the background of any discussion of free speech and
trademark rights.

37. Compare Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (listing eight variables in the confusion analysis: (1) strength of the mark,
(2) degree of similarity, (3) proximity of the two products being sold, (4) likelihood
of the two product lines coming into competition, (5) actual confusion, (6) the
defendant’s good faith, (7) quality of the products, and (8) sophistication of the
buyer), with SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding
only six factors to consider: (1) strength of the mark, (2) degree of similarity,
(3) proximity of the goods, (4) intent of the defendants, (5) evidence of actual
confusion, and (6) conditions of the purchase).
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. a (1995) (stating
that any factor relevant in determining likelihood of confusion is valid, despite the
fact that “[n]o mechanistic formula or list can set forth in advance the variety of
factors” that can be used); MERGES, ET AL., supra note 22, at 714 (observing that while
the factors in each circuit can be different, the final tests are similar in substance).
39. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 348–49.
41. See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (noting the Eighth Circuit’s
general application of the likelihood of confusion standard in such cases despite
claiming to apply a test balancing the interests of consumer confusion and free
expression).
42. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490,
495 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that the Second Circuit’s Polaroid likelihood
of confusion test for confusion “is at best awkward in the context of parody” because
it was developed in commercial situations); Cantwell, supra note 34, at 580–81
(noting that the traditional confusion analysis tests were “developed from cases
involving purely commercial exploitation”).
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B. The Campbell Distinction in Copyright Law and the Process of Its
Incorporation into Trademark
43

In the copyright case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the
Supreme Court articulated what it saw as the distinction between
parody and satire. The conflict in Campbell arose when the rap group
2 Live Crew wrote an unauthorized parody of the well-known Roy
Orbison song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by copying elements of the
44
original work, including the opening bass riff and many of the lyrics.
In an opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice Souter held that the 2
Live Crew rap was protected as fair use under the Copyright Act
because it was a transformative parody that commented on the
45
original Orbison song.
Although the Court’s final holding was important for free speech
rights in copyright, the section of the opinion relevant to satire and
parody in trademark law is merely dicta in which Justice Souter
46
examined the nature of the two forms of criticism.
Parody,
according to the Court, “needs to mimic an original to make its
point,” and so in parody it is necessary to use “elements of a prior
author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
47
comments on that author’s works.”
Thus, parody is a protected
form of expression because of the need to borrow from the original
48
piece.
Conversely, satire “has no critical bearing on the substance or style
of the original composition” and “can stand on its own two feet, and
49
so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”
Satire is
different from parody because it is a comment on something other
than the borrowed work, such as society as a whole, whereas parody is

43. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
44. Id. at 588. Compare ROY ORBISON, Oh, Pretty Woman, on OH, PRETTY WOMAN
(Monument Records 1964) (“Pretty Woman, walking down the street/Pretty Woman,
the kind I like to meet . . . . Pretty Woman, don’t walk on by/Pretty Woman, don’t
make me cry/Pretty Woman, don’t walk away . . . .”), with 2 LIVE CREW, Pretty Woman,
on AS CLEAN AS THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records 1989) (“Pretty woman walkin’ down
the street/Pretty woman girl you look so sweet . . . . Big hairy woman all that hair
ain’t legit . . . . Two timin’ woman that takes a load off my mind/Two timin’ woman
now I know the baby ain’t mine . . . .”).
45. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (finding that the song commented on the
“naiveté of the original” with “degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh
of relief from paternal responsibility”).
46. Id. at 580–82.
47. Id. at 580–81.
48. Id.; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (ruling that a
political caricature of Jerry Falwell was an “ad parody” worthy of protection as free
expression).
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
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50

only an imitation of an earlier work. Therefore, satire is not given
the same amount of protection as parody, and is often found to
51
infringe on a valid copyright. While Justice Souter did potentially
allow for the protection of satire by writing that loose parody and
forms of satire could be permitted when there is little risk of market
52
substitution, lower courts have not recognized this small window
53
and continue to favor parody alone as protected speech.
The distinction between parody and satire was in no way universally
accepted before it was adopted by the Court in Campbell, and literary
definitions of the terms differ from what was espoused by Justice
54
Souter. Indeed, the notion that there was no set understanding of
parody and satire before Campbell is clearly illustrated by the fact that
55
courts used the words interchangeably in the past. However, despite
50. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:156 (reading Campbell as saying that
parody makes fun of the original work directly while satire uses the work as a vehicle
to comment on a “societal folly”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (8th ed.
2004) (defining parody as a “transformative use of a well-known work for the
purposes of satirizing, ridiculing, critiquing, or commenting on the original work, as
opposed to merely alluding to the original to draw attention to the later work”).
Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580, 581 n.15 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1317 (3d ed. 1992)) (characterizing “parody as a ‘literary or artistic work that
imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule’”),
with id. (citing 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1989)) (noting that
“satire has been defined as a work ‘in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed with
ridicule’”).
51. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:156 (recognizing that parody can be
protected as fair use under copyright, whereas satire cannot); cf. SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2001) (accepting the
defendant’s fair use argument in a copyright infringement action because the book
in question was a clear parody of “Gone With The Wind” and not a more general
satiric comment on the society of the American South during the Civil War).
52. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 n.14 (hinting that satire could be protected with
less justification than normally required if it is unlikely to serve as a substitute for the
original work in the marketplace).
53. See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1268 (applying the language of Campbell to declare
that parody can be a protected form of criticism, whereas satire cannot); Bruce P.
Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits
Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 984 (2004) (observing that most post-Campbell cases
have ignored Justice Souter’s footnote fourteen reasoning, instead relying on the
“easier wholesale parody/satire distinction”).
54. See, e.g., Christopher J. Brown, Comment, A Parody of a Distinction: The Ninth
Circuit’s Conflicted Differentiation Between Parody and Satire, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 721, 734–35 (2004) (outlining the various literary definitions of
parody and noting that some have argued that parody need not make a comment on
the original work).
55. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (defining both
parody and satire as when an artist “for comic effect or social commentary, closely
imitates the style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art work that makes
ridiculous the style and expression of the original”); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (explaining that parody and satire “deserv[e] substantial
freedom” as entertainment and social criticism); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F.
Supp. 1186, 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (acknowledging that satire and parody are forms
of fair use); see also Dorsen, supra note 12, at 923, 925 (describing parody as a form of
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the many opinions on what exactly constitutes a satire or a parody,
the definitions formed in Campbell are, for all practical purposes,
those that must be used within the legal world.
Because Campbell was a copyright case, there was no requirement
that the dicta defining parody and satire should apply to trademark
infringement cases. However, commentators were quick to note that
because some similarities exist between copyright and trademark law,
56
the Campbell distinction may apply to both fields.
This initial
suggestion was rapidly adopted by judges in lower courts across the
country who used Justice Souter’s definitions from Campbell to hold
that parodies that comment directly on a senior trademark could be
protected as free expression if there is no consumer confusion,
57
whereas the satirical use of a mark could not. Therefore, courts
have held that trademark parodies are less likely to confuse
consumers because they target the original work, as opposed to
satires, which use the mark as a conduit for a comment on society,
58
thus potentially inviting an increased amount of confusion.
C. The Second Circuit Test: A Foundation for Balancing the Interests in
Free Expression with Those of Consumer Confusion
Even before the parody/satire distinction from Campbell, courts
attempted to reconcile the protections of the First Amendment with
trademark law’s watchful eye against consumer confusion, the most
prominent effort being that of the Second Circuit in two cases from
59
1989, Rogers v. Grimaldi and Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
satire and later referring to satire as what would now be considered parody in the
post-Campbell world).
56. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:156 (acknowledging the possible analogy
between trademark and copyright law regarding the parody and satire dicta of
Campbell); Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons From the Copyright Decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 204 (1995)
(arguing that the logic of Campbell can be applied to trademark infringement
because of the nature of the two areas and the need for clear boundaries in
trademark law).
57. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999)
(declaring that any discussion of trademark parody must be considered in light of
the Campbell copyright ruling); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,
199–200 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging the authority of Campbell in ruling that a
comment on society was a satire and not granted protection); Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Campbell to
find infringement where Dr. Seuss’ style was not the object of the comment made by
the infringing work).
58. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:153 (emphasizing that in a traditional
trademark infringement suit, as opposed to one involving a dilution claim, labeling
the defendant’s work a parody is “merely a way of phrasing the traditional response
that customers are not likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship, or approval.”).
59. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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60

Publishing Group, Inc., both of which dealt with the misappropriation
of famous marks.
Rogers addressed a claim of trademark
infringement made by Ginger Rogers, who gained fame as Fred
61
Astaire’s on-screen partner in a variety of Hollywood musicals.
Rogers sued claiming that the Fellini film “Ginger and Fred,” a
fictional story of two Italian dancers who imitate the style of Rogers
and Astaire, infringed on the trademark right in her name by
62
inferring that she was associated with the film. In its analysis, the
Second Circuit first noted that titles of creative works demand more
First Amendment protection than names of normal commercial
63
products because they contain an expressive element. Because of
this increased protection, the traditional infringement test does not
apply, and instead infringement under the Lanham Act should be
found “only where the public interest in avoiding consumer
64
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”
Turning to the case at hand, the Rogers court found that when titles
are involved, the unauthorized use of a trademark will be permitted
as long as the title has some artistic relevance to the underlying work
and does not “explicitly mislead[] as to the source or content of the
65
work.” Therefore, because the title “Ginger and Fred” was relevant
to the film and did not indicate that Rogers was involved in its
production, the borrowing of her name was found to be a permitted
66
use of the trademark under the First Amendment.
The Second Circuit was quickly presented with a chance to expand
the logic from its Rogers decision when it decided Cliffs Notes, a case
67
that dealt with a parody of the famous series of study guides. Here
the object of the infringement action was the cover of a humor
magazine that borrowed Cliffs Notes’ distinctive yellow and black
striped cover design in a book mocking three lesser-to-unknown
68
novels. In its examination, the court noted that, much like titles, a
60. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
62. Id. at 996–97.
63. See id. at 998 (explaining that titles are “of a hybrid nature” because they
combine the promotion of the product with the expression of the creator, and thus
their artistic and commercial elements are “inextricably intertwined”).
64. Id. at 999. While the Second Circuit purported to adopt this test generally, it
has not been fully accepted by other courts, and has been limited to titles. See
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
consumer confusion in a satirical advertisement); infra Part II.A (addressing the
limitations of the Second Circuit test).
65. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
66. Id. at 1000–01.
67. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
492 (2d Cir. 1989).
68. Id.
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parody requires increased protection because it contains expressive
69
elements that go beyond ordinary commercial labeling. Thus, as in
Rogers, the Second Circuit once again sought to balance the public’s
interest in free expression with that of avoiding consumer confusion
and moved quickly to a discussion of the parodic nature of the
70
defendant’s work.
Although Cliffs Notes was decided before the Supreme Court’s
distinction between parody and satire in Campbell, the Second
Circuit’s definition of protected parody is quite similar to what was
71
eventually adopted by Justice Souter.
The court in Cliffs Notes
argued that parodies require increased protection because they are
an artistic expression in which there is a “need to evoke the original
72
work.” As such, the defendant’s work was found to be a parody.
While the court noted that there will always be an increased risk of
confusion when an artistic expression such as parody is involved, the
risk in Cliffs Notes was sufficiently outweighed by the public’s interest
73
in promoting the commentary that healthy parody provides. Thus,
while Cliffs Notes did take the important step of expanding the Rogers
test to the realm of parody, it did not take the balancing as far as
possible because it was limited to what is now understood as parody in
the wake of Campbell.
If the Second Circuit can be considered progressive for developing
the Rogers and Cliffs Notes balancing test, then it stands squarely
opposite from the Eighth Circuit, which has led the charge to restrict
74
the appropriation of trademarks, even in expressive contexts.
Perhaps the most notable instance of this rigid application of
75
trademark law came in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,
where a designer borrowed the insurance company’s logo and name
76
to create a “Mutant of Omaha” post-apocalyptic line of t-shirts. In
69. Id. at 495. While not explicitly addressing titles, the infringement action in
Cliffs Notes dealt with the cover of the parodic work, which is sufficiently similar to a
title to lend comparison. See id. at 494 (rejecting the argument that Rogers is
irrelevant because it specifically addressed titles).
70. Id. at 495.
71. See id. at 495–96 (“[A] literary work is parody if, taken as a whole, it pokes fun
at its subject.”); supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining Justice
Souter’s definition of parody).
72. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495. This language is almost identical to that of
Campbell, which explained that parody “needs to mimic an original to make its
point.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).
73. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495.
74. See Myers, supra note 56, at 200 (contending that the Eighth Circuit has
applied a strict test that frequently finds infringement, “often in cases of legitimate
parody”).
75. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 398.
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the resulting infringement suit, the court heavily emphasized the
property rights that Mutual of Omaha possessed in its trademarks and
found that when “alternate avenues” of expression exist there is little
77
protection for the defendant’s chosen forum of a t-shirt. The court
noted that the decision was limited to this one “avenue” of
particularly commercial expression—t-shirts—and that, much like in
the rights of real property, the defendant could take his parody
78
elsewhere to convey his message. This reasoning, when combined
with a finding of consumer confusion, led the court to hold that the t79
shirts constituted unlawful infringement.
At no point in its decision did the Mutual of Omaha court attempt
to balance the interests of the public in free expression with that of
80
avoiding consumer confusion. However, this was not the case in
81
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, in which the Eighth
Circuit did at least pay lip service to the Second Circuit’s balance by
82
announcing an application of the Cliffs Notes standard; yet, in the
end, this was nothing more than a smokescreen that hid a traditional
83
Balducci involved a humor
likelihood of confusion analysis.
magazine that borrowed several trademarks belonging to AnheuserBusch to comment on the effects of a recent oil spill in a river that

77. See id. at 402 (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))
(finding that First Amendment rights yield to property rights when the same
expression can be accomplished in another medium, such as a book or magazine).
78. See id. (reasoning that because there are many other ways to disseminate his
message, neither the defendant nor the public were denied speech rights or
benefits). But see Cantwell, supra note 34, at 562 (noting the criticism of the Mutual
of Omaha court and the “alternative avenues” test for its “false analogy between real
property and intellectual property” and reliance on Lloyd Corp.); Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 206 (1982) (asserting that if the only
injury to a trademark arises from a defendant’s expression of ideas, then simply
citing Lloyd Corp. to say alternate avenues exist is not sufficient to satisfy the demands
of the First Amendment). In Lloyd Corp., the Supreme Court held that protesters
could be barred from real property (a shopping mall) if their protest could be
undertaken elsewhere with a similarly effective result. 407 U.S. at 567.
79. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403.
80. See id. at 399 (identifying the likelihood of confusion test as the appropriate
method of analysis).
81. 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
82. See id. at 776 (citing Cliffs Notes to say that it is appropriate to balance the
public interests in free expression against those of consumer confusion).
83. See id. at 774–75 (determining that confusion existed between the alleged
parody and the senior trademark); see also Myers, supra note 56, at 201 (discussing
how the Eighth Circuit’s “strict application of the likelihood of confusion test” would
result in liability for all but the most “heavy handed parody”); Mark V.B. Partridge,
Trademark Parody and the First Amendment: Humor in the Eye of the Beholder, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 877, 884–85 (1996) (explaining that the court in Balducci did not
apply any kind of heightened standard addressing free speech, and only concerned
itself with First Amendment protections after confusion had been found).
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84

provided some of the brewery’s water supply. After finding that
85
there was both potential and actual confusion, the court quickly
disposed of the protections offered by the Second Circuit balancing
test and determined that the work did not convey the message that it
86
was a parody. In so doing, the court found that the defendant’s
work was not worthy of protection because the failure to acknowledge
that it was not sponsored by Anheuser-Busch led to an unacceptable
amount of confusion, a conclusion undoubtedly reached after the
87
court’s initial infringement analysis.
The two approaches to trademark infringement in the context of
parody adopted by the Second and Eighth Circuits are at the
extremes of the doctrine and offer an interesting comparison when
88
examining the scope of the field as it exists today. However, while
the Second Circuit test is the most expansive in its protection of the
expressive uses of trademarks, it is by no means a safe haven for free
speech, especially where satire is concerned.
II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW
DEMAND AN EXPANSION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT TEST TO PROTECT
THE SATIRICAL USE OF FAMOUS MARKS
The desire to grant increased protection to those who use
trademarks to create expressive satires commenting on society goes
well beyond the simple wish to expand the reach of the First
Amendment, and is instead grounded in substantive law. Part A of
this section explains why the current standard for weighing consumer
confusion against free expression falls short of protecting satire as
defined by Campbell via a discussion of four recent circuit court cases.
Part B then argues that expanded protection for satire is justified
because of the varying natures and divergent goals of copyright and
trademark law. Finally, Part C concludes by contending that famous
trademarks should be allowed in satirical expressions because they
are a part of the society on which the satire seeks to comment.

84. Balducci, 28 F.3d at 772.
85. Id. at 774–75.
86. Id. at 777.
87. Id.; see Partridge, supra note 83 (noting the high standard for protection
imposed by the court in Balducci and its reliance on the likelihood of confusion test).
88. See Myers, supra note 56, at 193–200 (comparing the more restrictive Eighth
Circuit test that focuses heavily on likelihood of confusion with the more forgiving
Second Circuit test that affords more weight to free expression); Partridge, supra
note 83, at 882–86 (tracing the development of the different tests).
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A. Limitations on the Second Circuit Balancing Test
Simply put, the Second Circuit balancing test is incomplete when
considering the full scope of protection that should be given to those
who use famous trademarks in an expressive work. This section
explains the two major limitations of the test: its continued reliance
on the parody/satire distinction from copyright and the misguided
emphasis that it places on the titles of parodic works. First, because
the Second Circuit’s balancing analysis only protects what was
89
eventually defined as parody by Campbell, it forces courts to apply the
distinction between protected parody and unprotected satire, a
90
difference that can be almost impossible to discern. Second, the test
91
in its current form only applies to the titles of works that have been
92
Thus, the Second Circuit
identified as parodies under Campbell.
balancing test, even when it is truly applied and not simply
93
mentioned in passing, does not protect satire as understood in
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that, although the Second
Circuit test was established in Rogers and Cliffs Notes before Justice Souter’s Campbell
ruling, those cases have practically the same definition of parody that was used by the
Supreme Court).
90. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the parody/satire distinction
has caused cases with similar fact patterns to result in drastically different rulings. See
Brown, supra note 54, at 738–42 (comparing the two Ninth Circuit cases of Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), and Mattel v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), to determine that had the Ninth Circuit
applied the logic from its holding in Dr. Seuss to Mattel, the defendants’ song would
not have been a permitted parody, and conversely, that had the logic of Mattel been
applied to Dr. Seuss, the book in question would have been allowed as free
expression). For a full discussion of Dr. Seuss and Mattel, see infra notes 105–111,
124–131 and accompanying text.
91. See Partridge, supra note 83, at 887 (noting that other courts have declined to
apply Rogers in different situations because it was limited to titles of works); supra
notes 61–66 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the balancing test in
Rogers and its application in that case to the title of a movie).
92. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (explaining the application of
the test to parodies in Cliffs Notes, in which the court defined parody in the same way
that the Supreme Court would in the later Campbell decision).
93. For instance, in Balducci, the court referenced the Second Circuit test when
purporting to balance the public interest in free expression with that of avoiding
consumer confusion, but barely did any actual balancing, having already found
confusion between the two marks. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d
769, 775–76 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, the finding of confusion before the court had
done an examination of the parodic or satiric nature of the work acted as a
presumption against free expression when the balancing test was later applied. See
Cantwell, supra note 34, at 581 (arguing that the approach in Balducci “risks
undermining First Amendment protections” and that its balancing test consisted only
of the observation that the “First Amendment does not protect parodies that are
confusing”). The example of Balducci shows how the Second Circuit test can be
misapplied and focus an inordinate amount of attention on likelihood of confusion
at the expense of a proper examination of the defendant’s right to free expression.
For a better approach, see Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir,
1999), which first found parody and then used this as a factor that influences all
other elements in a likelihood of confusion analysis. However, in the ideal approach
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94

Campbell. The exclusion of satire results in lawyers protecting their
clients against trademark infringement claims by attempting to
95
classify every creative work as a parody, a process that leads to
uncertainty regarding which expressions will be offered protection
and which will be subject to liability.
This uncertainty exists not only in the abstract world of law reviews
and classrooms, but also in a variety of circuit court cases. While The
Onion was lucky in that none of the potential parties brought suit for
trademark infringement after the confusion created by its faux
headline, others have not been so fortunate. Indeed, there have
been trademark infringement cases involving everything from the
96
97
estates of Dr. Seuss and Elvis Presley to the music of the Danish
98
99
pop band Aqua and the rap group OutKast. In what is a clear
illustration of the imperfections of the Second Circuit test, only one
of these cases resulted in the use of the trademark in question being
100
deemed protected speech.
The Second Circuit test is limited to the protection of Campbell
parody, and as commentators have explained, the “distinction
101
between parody and satire is in the eye of the presiding judge;” a
notion that was clearly on display in two cases that illustrate the line
separating protected trademark parody and banned trademark satire:
102
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. and Elvis Presley
103
Enterprises v. Capece. These cases are noteworthy because, while the
courts did not expressly use the Second Circuit test, they applied a
similar balancing test weighing free expression and consumer

to examining a work’s use of a trademark, the time at which a parody or satire is
found would not be dispositive.
94. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (noting that a satire under
Campbell is something that can stand alone and is a comment on a larger aspect of
society, as opposed to parody that targets the original work).
95. See Keller & Tushnet, supra note 53, at 984 (asserting that the distinction
between parody and satire “is far too malleable in the hands of a capable practitioner
or judge” and is thus subject to creative lawyering). Compare Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at
1401 (holding a work borrowing Dr. Seuss’ style to mock the O.J. Simpson trial was
satire unworthy of protection), with Brown, supra note 54, at 740 (arguing that the
work in Dr. Seuss can be considered a parody).
96. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d 1394.
97. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
98. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
100. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (holding that the use of the Barbie trademark was
permitted because it was the subject of a parodic song).
101. Keller & Tushnet, supra note 53, at 990.
102. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
103. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
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confusion, and in both instances the satiric nature of the defendants’
104
work resulted in a finding of confusion and infringement.
Shortly after the O.J. Simpson murder trial, an author and
illustrator collaborated to publish The Cat NOT in the Hat!, a book
mocking the trial through the use of various trademarks belonging to
105
the estate of Dr. Seuss.
After disposing of the initial copyright
106
claim, the Ninth Circuit discussed the Campbell distinction and
found the defendants’ book to be a satire because it was neither
transformative nor did it comment on the original work of Dr.
107
Seuss. The court continued by listing examples of prior trademark
infringement cases in which courts have upheld an injunction against
a defense of free expression and found that this case was similar
because the claimed parody did not extinguish consumer
108
confusion.
Specifically, the court noted that the defendants used
the Dr. Seuss mark to draw attention to their own work without any
attempt to distinguish the source of the target from the source of the
109
parody. Therefore, because the use of the trademarks from The Cat
in the Hat fell under the Campbell definition of satire and potentially
110
created consumer confusion, the court barred publication of the
111
satiric work.
104. See Id. at 198–99 (conceding that parody is an important factor in analyzing
confusion, but using Campbell to find that the defendant’s expression was a satire
unworthy of protection in any kind of balance); Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403, 1405
(identifying likelihood of confusion as the appropriate test, but also acknowledging
that, had the defendants’ work been a true parody, it would have been a factor that
influenced the court’s analysis).
105. See Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1396–97 (noting that Dr. Seuss “owns the common
law trademarks to the words ‘Dr. Seuss’ and ‘Cat in the Hat,’ as well as the character
illustration of the Cat’s stove-pipe hat,” all of which were borrowed by the
defendants).
106. The case also involved a substantial copyright infringement claim, in which
the court found both that there had been violations of the Copyright Act and that
there was no valid fair use defense available because the book was a satire that
borrowed the style of Dr. Seuss to ridicule the Simpson trial rather than the original
work. Id. at 1401.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1405–06 (citing Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp.
838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting an injunction against a manufacturer prohibiting it
from producing “a diaper bag with green and red bands and the wording ‘Gucchi
Goo,’ allegedly poking fun at the well-known Gucci name and the design mark”) and
Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25 (D. Conn. 1991) (granting summary
judgment in favor of the manufacturer of “A.1.” steak sauce where a competing
company developed a meat sauce called “A.2”)).
109. The Dr. Seuss court compared its case to Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v.
Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991), in which the defendant
borrowed the well-known Hard Rock Café logo and slogan in order to draw attention
to his sale of t-shirts. See id. at 1405-06.
110. The court in Dr. Seuss used the eight factor Sleekcraft likelihood of confusion
test, but found that, due to the preliminary injunction against publication, many of
the factors could not be determined. However, the opinion did hold that the “Cat in
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Only one year after the Ninth Circuit ruling in Dr. Seuss, the Fifth
Circuit decided a similar case that only confirmed the fact that any
current balancing test is restricted to parody. In Elvis, a 1960sthemed restaurant called “The Velvet Elvis” was sued by Elvis Presley
Enterprises for trademark infringement because of the name of the
112
restaurant, the décor, and the advertising methods used. Although
the court in Elvis acknowledged that a parody claim is relevant when
113
considering the factors in a likelihood of confusion analysis, it was,
much to the disappointment of patrons of “The Velvet Elvis,” also
114
quick to turn to Campbell dicta and find that the restaurant was an
unprotected satire because it targeted the society of the 1960s and
115
“[did] not even attempt to parody the celebrity of Elvis Presley.”
Therefore, because the restaurant was a comment on 1960s society, it
did not “require the use of [Elvis’] marks because it d[id] not target
116
Elvis Presley.”
After the determination that the use of the senior
Elvis marks was a satire, it became easy for the court to find a
likelihood of consumer confusion because of the similarity and
117
proximity of the marks, seniority of the Elvis trademark, and
118
evidence of actual confusion.
As a result, “The Velvet Elvis”
infringed upon the marks held by the estate of Elvis Presley, and even
119
though Elvis was undoubtedly a part of the culture of the 1960s, a

the Hat” mark was similar to the character used in the defendants’ book and that the
senior mark was used solely to capture consumer attention. Id. at 1404–05.
111. Id. at 1406.
112. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1998)
(describing the interior of the restaurant as having photographs, statues, velvet
paintings of Elvis, vinyl furniture, beaded curtains, a menu serving “Love Me
Blenders,” and advertisements featuring Elvis’ name and image); Jenny Karambelas,
Epilogue: Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998), 9
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 223, 223 (1998) (describing the additional
menu items as peanut butter and banana sandwiches, which were a favorite of Elvis’,
and another sandwich known as “Your Football Hound Dog”).
113. Elvis, 141 F.3d at 194.
114. See id. at 199 (interpreting Campbell as holding that a defendant’s work needs
to reference the original in order to be called parody under copyright law and
determining that the “same need to conjure up the original exists when a parody
targets a trademark”).
115. Id. at 200.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 202 (recognizing that Elvis Presley Enterprises had planned to open
a worldwide chain of restaurants).
118. See id. at 200–05 (applying the factors from the likelihood of confusion test to
find that the defendant’s use of the mark was unlawful).
119. See Nicholas C. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity⎯When Symbolic
Names and Images Pass into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 125 (1994)
(contending that Elvis is synonymous with the Rock-and-Roll movement).
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1960s-themed restaurant was barred from using his name or likeness
120
to satirize the values of the era.
Dr. Seuss and Elvis serve to demonstrate that, even under the
Second Circuit test—largely considered to be the most likely to
121
permit the expressive use of trademarks —satire remains
unprotected. However, beyond the limitation of the parody/satire
distinction, the Second Circuit test only protects titles that are
deemed relevant to an underlying parodic work, a fact best
122
demonstrated through a comparison of Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc.
123
and Parks v. LaFace Records, two cases with seemingly inconsistent
results. Mattel involved the toy company’s trademark in Barbie, a
“symbol of American girlhood . . . who graces the aisles of toy stores
124
throughout the country and beyond,” which was borrowed by the
band Aqua. The song in question, “Barbie Girl,” poked fun at the
famous doll through lyrics such as “I’m a Barbie girl, in the Barbie
world/Life in plastic, it’s fantastic” and “Come on, Barbie, let’s go
125
party, ah ah ah yeah.” In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that
126
the work was a parody because it targeted the Barbie mark itself.
The court first acknowledged the problems that can occur when the
traditional likelihood of confusion test is applied to marks that “enter
our public discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary”
127
like that of Barbie.
The court then abandoned the likelihood of
confusion test altogether and cited the balancing test used by the
128
Second Circuit in Rogers to find that, because the use of the mark
“Barbie” in the title was relevant to the underlying parodic work,
129
there was no infringement in either the song or its title.
While
there was language in the Mattel decision that could potentially be
120. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 207 (reversing the lower court decision in favor of “The
Velvet Elvis” and entering judgment for Elvis’ estate).
121. See Myers, supra note 56, at 200 (finding that the test used by the Second
Circuit in Cliffs Notes is more “attuned to the particular concerns that arise in parody
cases” than those used by other circuits); supra Part I.C (comparing the test of the
Second Circuit to the more restrictive approach used by the Eighth Circuit).
122. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
123. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
124. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 898.
125. AQUA, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997).
126. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (distinguishing this case from the earlier Ninth
Circuit case of Dr. Seuss because it did not borrow the Barbie mark solely to get
attention, but instead to target the trademark for ridicule). For a full discussion on
Dr. Seuss, see infra notes 105–111 and accompanying text.
127. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (explaining that the Sleekcraft test “fails to account
for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression” when a trademark has
acquired an expressive meaning apart from identifying source of origin).
128. See id. at 901–02 (applying the logic of Rogers to hold that titles which borrow
famous marks are permitted if they concern the underlying work).
129. Id. at 902.
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130

used to increase protection for satire, in the end the court returned
to the familiar ground of Campbell and the Second Circuit test,
granting Aqua a reprieve but containing any discussion of trademark
131
satire to the limited world of Rogers and Cliffs Notes.
If Mattel can be seen as the correct application of the Second
132
Circuit balance, then Parks v. LaFace Records demonstrates both the
unpredictability and limitations of the title component of the test.
Parks involved the rap duo OutKast and their popular song Rosa
133
Parks, which became the subject of a trademark infringement action
when Rosa Parks filed suit against the group alleging that there was
134
potential confusion regarding her endorsement of the song.
The
Sixth Circuit, much like the Ninth Circuit in Mattel, deemed the
135
traditional likelihood of confusion test to be inappropriate, and
instead advocated the test established in Rogers and used in Mattel,
claiming that only that test can correctly weigh the interests of free
136
expression and consumer confusion.
However, in the application
of the Second Circuit test, the court did not hesitate to find that the
lyrics of the OutKast song contained “absolutely nothing that could
conceivably, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered,
explicitly or implicitly, a reference” to Rosa Parks or the civil rights
movement, and therefore the title had no relevance to the
underlying work and was an infringement on the trademark Rosa
137
Parks held in her name.
Thus, both because there was no
connection between the title of the song and its content and because
130. The court hinted at increased First Amendment protection by explaining
that the owner of a trademark does not have unlimited rights, especially when the
public has given the mark “a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.” Id. at
900. Thus, it seems that to the Ninth Circuit when a trademark has become so
famous that it “fill[s] in gaps in our vocabulary and add[s] a contemporary flavor to
our expressions,” it can be used in ways that go beyond the realm of consumer
confusion and make traditional infringement analysis irrelevant. Id.
131. See id. at 901–02 (repeating the logic of Campbell in saying that when an
artistic work targets, as opposed to borrows, a senior mark, it is granted additional
First Amendment protection, and applying the Rogers test to find that the use of the
Barbie mark was relevant to the underlying song).
132. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
133. The song contains lyrics such as “everybody move to the back of the bus” and
“she got off the bus.” OUTKAST, Rosa Parks, on AQUEMINI (LaFace Records 1998).
The group OutKast is comprised of the rappers known as Andre 3000 and Big Boi.
134. Parks, 329 F.3d at 441.
135. See id. at 448–49 (reasoning that the traditional test does not adequately
protect First Amendment interests).
136. Id. at 450 (recognizing that the Mattel method can “balance the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion with the public interest in free expression”).
137. Id. at 453. The court did acknowledge that the song repeatedly contained
the phrase “move to the back of the bus” but determined that this had to be
considered in the context of the overall lyrics of the song, which had nothing to do
with Rosa Parks. Id. at 452. The court also noted that the defendants admitted that
the use of the name “Rosa Parks” was only symbolic. Id.
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the work was not defended as a parody, the use of the “Rosa Parks”
139
trademark constituted unlawful infringement, leaving OutKast with
140
few options but to settle out of court.
Parks provides a clear example of the confusion that can result
from the application of the Second Circuit test in its current form.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the test from Rogers and Cliffs Notes
protecting titles of parodies would fail in Parks because “it cannot be
said that the title Rosa Parks is clearly relevant to the lyrics of the
141
song.”
However, it is easy to see how the lyrics, which mention
moving to the back of the bus, conversing with a woman on a bus,
and advocate changing society, are indeed relevant to the name Rosa
142
Parks. Thus, in this case, it seems that the judges perhaps did not
quite grasp the potential subtleties of this particular song and its title
when they overlooked the cultural significance of asking someone to
move to the back of the bus, a request that necessarily invokes Rosa
143
Parks.
Therefore, the fact that the Second Circuit test concerns
itself only with the titles of what a court deems to be a parody can
lead to unpredictable results based largely on the skill of the lawyer
and the disposition of the judge, an unwelcome development when
dealing with the First Amendment.
138. See id. at 456 (acknowledging the First Amendment protections of parody but
saying that there has been no attempt to justify the song as a parody or satire in the
present case). But see infra note 211 (arguing that courts should be free to protect
parody or satire regardless of whether that specific issue has been raised by
defendants).
139. Parks, 329 F.3d at 459.
140. See David Shepardson & Joe Menard, Parks Settles OutKast Lawsuit, THE
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 15, 2005, at C1, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/me
tro/0504/16/D01-151386.htm (reporting that the group has settled the suit with
Rosa Parks after a six year legal battle).
141. Parks, 329 F.3d at 456.
142. The song included phrases like “everybody move to the back of the bus,” “got
to her station here’s my destination/she got off the bus, the conversation lingered in
my head for hours,” “we stabbing every city,” and “damn we the committee gone
burn it down.” OUTKAST, supra note 133.
143. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit panel relied on a “translation” of the song’s chorus
submitted by the plaintiff that read: “[b]e quiet and stop the commotion. OutKast is
coming back out [with new music] so all other MCs [mic checkers, rappers, Master
of Ceremonies] step aside. Do you want to ride and hang out with us? OutKast is the
type of group to make the clubs get hyped-up/excited.” Parks, 329 F.3d at 452. The
original lyrics of the song are as follows: “Ah ha, hush that fuss/Everybody move to
the back of the bus/Do you wanna bump and slump with us/We the type of people
make the club get crunk.” OUTKAST, supra note 133. The judges’ need for a
translation seems to demonstrate a general lack of understanding of the lyrics of the
song in question and of the rap genre in general. Of course, that is not to say that all
judges misinterpret or misunderstand rap lyrics. See United States v. Murphy, 406
F.3d 857, 859 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005) (correcting the court reporter while rightly
assuming that in the context of the case the term “hoe,” as in a gardening tool,
actually meant “ho,” which is “a staple of rap vernacular as, for example, when
Ludacris raps ‘You doin’ ho activities with ho tendencies’”).
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Cases such as Dr. Seuss, Elvis, Mattel, and Parks demonstrate that the
Second Circuit balancing test is limited to both the Campbell
definition of parody and to the titles of such works. As a result, many
commentators have argued for an expanded understanding of
parody that contradicts Justice Souter instead of simply endorsing
protection for trademark satire. For example, one such proposal
144
sought to amend the Lanham Act to include a parody defense, a
145
situation that is both unlikely and does not offer protection to the
146
Others have called
full breadth of the satire defined by Campbell.
for solutions as diverse as adding new factors to the likelihood of
147
148
confusion analysis to fashioning a completely new test; however,
in each case protection is either restricted to parody or the
definitions embraced by the Supreme Court in Campbell are simply
149
ignored.
Thus, the current Second Circuit test not only has a
tendency to be manipulated and misapplied, but also encourages
myopic solutions that serve only to either limit protection to parody
at the expense of satire or to disregard the standard set in Campbell.
It is then easy to see that while the Second Circuit test is a solid
foundation for expanding trademark rights, it does not go far
enough because it still excludes satire from the scope of protection.

144. See Kelly L. Baxter, Trademark Parody: How to Balance the Lanham Act with the
First Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1179, 1208–09 (2004) (calling for an explicit
parody defense and defining parody as a work that conveys the message and is either
the original or a parody).
145. While the Lanham Act has indeed been amended in the past, the most
notable example of this was the FTDA, which served to enhance the ability of
trademark owners to control their marks, and thus aid powerful companies and the
economy, as opposed to expanding free expression. See supra notes 33–35 and
accompanying text (comparing infringement actions under the FTDA, which
increase a company’s power to bring suit, with traditional likelihood of confusion
cases). For a discussion on how parody and satire cases are influenced by market
considerations, see generally Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!:
Parody, Satire, and Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589 (2002).
146. Although an amendment to the Lanham Act would, of course, serve to bypass
the Court’s ruling in Campbell, the likelihood of such a law passing is so small that it is
best to work within the parameters set by Justice Souter and the Court.
147. See Emily Adelman, Note, Trademark Parodies: When is it OK to Laugh?, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 72, 86–89 (2006) (suggesting a removal of factors
such as the sophistication of consumers and the strength of the plaintiff’s mark while
adding new elements that take into account the differences between the mark and
the parody, the existence of a disclaimer, and the proximity between the message
and the trademark itself).
148. See Brown, supra note 54, at 748 (calling for a parody to be protected as free
expression so long as it can be considered an “ironic refunctioning of a prior work”).
149. See Adelman, supra note 147, at 88 (limiting her discussion of the factors to
be added to the likelihood of confusion test to the context of parody, rather than
expanding it to satire); Brown, supra note 54, at 748 (abandoning the distinction
between parody and satire from Campbell altogether in favor of the ironic
refunctioning test).
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B. The Nature and Purpose of Trademark Law Allows for the Protection of
Expressive Satire
The first justification for the expansion of the Second Circuit test
lies in the differences between trademark and copyright law. As
discussed above, Campbell, which established the current distinctions
between parody and satire, dealt solely with copyright law, and it was
the decision of lower courts alone to import this distinction into
trademark. However, copyright law is fundamentally different from
150
trademark law because of the scope of rights being protected. For
151
example, in copyright law the owner of a valid copyright has an
152
exclusive set of rights designed to reward the owner, and the owner
153
alone, for his or her expressive creation.
This is different from
trademark law, which, although it does reward the owner of the
154
trademark for establishing a well-known mark, primarily serves the
155
public by ensuring that no consumer confusion exists.
150. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 6:14 (noting that the rights protected in
copyright are vastly different than those in trademark). There is a “bundle” of
exclusive rights protected in copyrights, but trademark rights are based on the
likelihood of confusion. Id.
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000) (declaring that any “original work[] of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” can be copyrighted so long
as it is not an idea, but rather an expression of that idea); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991) (explaining that an original work is
an independent creation with a modicum of creativity); Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99,
102–03 (1879) (finding that ideas are protected under patent law and not under
copyright law, which was designed to further only creative expression).
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (granting only the owner of a copyright the power
to reproduce, prepare derivate works, distribute copies, perform, display, or perform
via recording the work during the time during which the copyright is held). But see
2-8 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01 (release no. 72, 2007) (noting
that there are general limitations on the rights held by copyright owners, such as if
the allegedly infringing work was created by another independently, with no
knowledge of the older work).
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (stating that the initial author or authors of a work posses
the copyright of that work, but that it may be transferred during the life of
protection); see also 1-5 NIMMER, supra note 152, § 5.01 (noting the distinction
between works created prior to the effective date of the current Copyright Act, for
which protection begins at publication, with those created after the Act took effect in
1978, for which protection begins immediately after the work is fixed in a tangible
medium).
154. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 794
(5th Cir. 1983) (granting trademark protection, and the right to sue for
infringement, to a company that invested so much time and money into the
otherwise meaningless phrase “Fish-Fri” that consumers had endowed the phrase
with secondary meaning, thus giving it a source-designating function that made it a
trademark).
155. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:33 (finding that trademark law has the
dual purpose of protecting the public by ensuring that we are aware of the origin of
products while also protecting the investment a company makes in developing good
will for its trademark and product line); MERGES ET AL., supra note 22, at 716
(identifying consumer confusion resulting from the similarity of two marks as the
“central problem at which trademark law is aimed”); 1 GILSON, supra note 25, § 1.03
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This difference in protection separates trademark law from
156
While the interests of a trademark or copyright
copyright law.
holder are protected in that they can both guard their mark or work
against infringement, this right is only tangentially protected in
trademark, where the true focus is on the protection of the public
against confusion, and not on the personal benefit of the owner of
157
the mark.
Indeed, when a company brings suit for trademark
infringement, the right being protected is “the right of the public to
be free of confusion,” and so it is the public who is being represented
158
in court, albeit via the company that owns the mark. This has led
commentators to argue that a trademark holder is not bringing suit
for harm to reputation in the defamatory sense when it alleges
confusion, but rather only in the sense that there is harm to the
159
mark’s “ability to distinguish one product from another.”
Quite
simply, consumer protection and trademark protection are one in
the same, which makes trademark different from other forms of more
160
traditional intellectual property law. Thus, while copyright, with its
focus on the rights of the creator, might need to include actions
against defendants who produce Campbell satire in the scope of their
infringement actions, in trademark law, which examines the rights of
the general public, this only serves to silence what would otherwise be
valuable speech.
(acknowledging that trademarks are vital to consumers because they guarantee
“freedom of choice by assuring that [the public is] not confused or deceived by an
array of similar” marks).
156. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 6:13 (distinguishing trademark law from
copyright law because trademarks can traditionally be copied as long as there is no
consumer confusion, whereas copyrights can never be legally reproduced without
the consent of the owner). But see Myers, supra note 56, at 204 (giving copyright law’s
protection of the author’s creative expression equal weight with that of trademark
law’s protection of the owner’s “commercial good will”).
157. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:33 (confirming that the protection of a
company’s trademark is “merely a facet of consumer protection” because the
consumer’s state of mind is paramount in any infringement suit, despite the fact that
the public is not a direct participant); 2 GILSON, supra note 25, § 5.01 (“The
fundamental aim of trademark law is to avoid . . . consumer confusion about the
source or products or services.”). That the emphasis on the consumer’s state of
mind is the dominant concern of the court in a trademark suit is confirmed by the
fact that the traditional trademark infringement analysis is the likelihood of
confusion test. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing the
likelihood of confusion test and the illustrative Sleekcraft factors).
158. Dorsen, supra note 12, at 942 (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976)); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21,
§ 2:33 (concluding that, in a trademark infringement action, the company bringing
suit is really acting as a proxy for the general public).
159. See Dorsen, supra note 12, at 942.
160. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:33 (concluding that the law of
trademarks has its foundation not solely in the property right of the holder, but
rather also in “the right of the consuming public to be told the truth” about the
products that they are buying).
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Beyond the differences in the nature and goals of trademark and
copyright law lies a distinction that is inherent to the kinds of speech
involved in each field. Authors and artists who obtain a valid
copyright have expressed themselves in a creative way that is
161
undoubtedly given the full protection of the First Amendment.
Therefore, it is only fair that they be afforded a wide amount of
defenses to guard against infringement. However, the use of
trademarks in marketing campaigns, while potentially creative, is still
nevertheless done for the sole purpose of selling a product, and
162
nothing more.
A trademark is thus much closer to commercial
speech, and because commercial speech can be regulated in a way
that expression cannot, it is given less protection in the realm of the
163
First Amendment.
As a result of the difference between the
expressive speech of copyright and the commercial speech of
trademark, those who wish to borrow marks in order to satirize
society in a creative way should be free to do so because they are
engaging in discourse that the Supreme Court has held to be of a
higher value than the commercial speech originally used by the
164
trademark’s owner.
161. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991)
(finding that only a modicum of creativity in the original work is necessary in order
for it to qualify for copyright protection); Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03
(1879) (declaring that copyright law is the correct forum for the protection of
expressions). But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that
although copyright owners have free speech protection, that protection still permits
“fair use” of the ideas in the copyrighted material by the public).
162. This is distinguished from an act like selling a book, which has commercial
aspects that are secondary to the primary goal of the creation of an expressive work.
Trademarks are closer to speech that can be described as “commercial intercourse
between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain,” and so
should be given less First Amendment protections. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
163. Indeed, states have more leeway to regulate commercial speech than they do
to control such controversial expressions as flag burning or lewd parody. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (striking down a Texas law prohibiting flag
burning as an unconstitutional restriction on expression); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (finding that an arguably obscene parody of Jerry
Falwell was protected as free speech even though it was a false statement of fact);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565
(1980) (holding that commercial speech can be regulated if it passes a four-part test
designed to ensure that the speech is not unreasonably interfered with).
164. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (noting that
commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection than non-commercial
speech). The notion that there is a two-tiered system of speech, one of high value
worthy of almost full protection, and one of a lesser value that can be regulated,
stems from the seminal free speech case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), which held that there is a class of speech that includes the “lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” that can be
restricted without cause for constitutional concern. Id. at 572–73.
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Despite this wide array of differences between trademark and
copyright law, there are those who believe that the fields are so
165
similar that it is possible to use their logic interchangeably, a view
that certainly encouraged applying Campbell dicta to trademark. In
support of this proposition, the success with which copyright law has
addressed free speech questions is cited as a helpful guide for
166
trademark. However, simply because copyright has had a somewhat
167
more consistent approach to fair use and some blending between
168
the two fields of law has already occurred does not mean that the
fundamental differences between copyright and trademark can be
ignored.
Indeed, although a unified body of copyright and
trademark law would be appealing, it remains that copyright favors
only the owner of the copyright itself, while trademark protects the
public at large, a fact that was acknowledged by the original
proponents of the Lanham Act and that cannot be overlooked
169
today.
The varying purposes of trademark and copyright law make it
dangerous to drag the Campbell distinction too far into trademark
doctrine, a process that unfortunately is well on its way. While it is
possible that the distinction between parody and satire is beneficial
170
and straightforward in copyright, it has no place in trademark
165. See Michael B. Weitman, Note, Fair Use in Trademark in the Post-KP Permanent
World: How Incorporating Principles from Copyright Law Will Lead to Less Confusion in
Trademark Law, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1665, 1688–92 (2006) (arguing that there are
similar motivations behind copyright and trademark protection and that both areas
of law serve basically the same purpose).
166. See D.V.L. Mastrullo, Comment, Trademark Parody Litigation and the Lanham
Act: Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1326–27 (1986)
(proposing that trademark adopt a fair use analysis like that of copyright because of
the similarities between the two bodies of law and the way in which it has been
applied in copyright).
167. See Weitman, supra note 165, at 1696 (determining that copyright law uses a
more comprehensive test to investigate fair use, one that, if adopted by trademark
law, will bring more consistency to the field).
168. See id. at 1699 (announcing that some judges have begun combining
copyright and trademark law in certain dilution actions).
169. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:4 (noting that supporters of the Lanham
Act stressed that trademark rights are different from those of copyright and patent
because they are not an exclusive grant of protection).
170. See Weitman, supra note 165, at 1699–1700 (lauding copyright law for its
consistent and successful handling of parody cases through the doctrine of fair use).
But see Keller & Tushnet, supra note 53, at 984 (stressing that the many practical
problems that the Campbell distinction has caused in copyright law should serve to
caution against its extension into trademark law); Adriana Collado, Note, Unfair Use:
The Lack of Fair Use Protection for Satire Under § 107 of the Copyright Act, 9 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 65, 66 (2004) (arguing that the distinction between satire and parody limits
free speech and is “contrary to the goal of copyright law”). In fact, courts may be
beginning to rethink the Campbell distinction even in copyright law. See Blanch v.
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting borrowing of a copyrighted
image as fair use because the defendant demonstrated a “genuine creative rationale”
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171

because of the entity being protected.
For instance, in the
previously-discussed example of satire from The Onion, any potential
suit would have to come from the owner of one of the trademarks
172
mentioned in the article.
However, any possible harm that was
caused as a result of the article was most likely incurred by the
Chinese public and not American consumers, whom the courts would
173
be trying to protect. Therefore, it seems clear that in this example
of satire it would be foolish for a court to find The Onion liable for
174
trademark infringement based on likelihood of confusion, and it
would be more appropriate to hold that the expressive, satirical work
was protected as free expression.
When examining an expressive satire that allegedly infringes on a
famous trademark, courts should be free to extend and apply the
currently limited Second Circuit balancing test because it is the duty
of the courts in trademark law to protect the interests of the
consuming public. Courts hearing trademark cases, as opposed to
175
copyright, are best suited to protect the interests of the public by
balancing the desire to avoid consumer confusion with the arguably
176
more important right to freedom of speech.
Thus, the balancing
test of the Second Circuit should not only apply to parody and titles,
but also to the expressive satires of famous trademarks. While this

for the borrowing, even though the court admitted that the potentially infringing
work was satire under the Campbell definition). For a full discussion on parody and
satire in copyright law, see generally 4-13 NIMMER, supra note 152, § 13.05(C).
171. See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text (noting that copyright
protects the rights of the owner alone, but trademark law protects primarily the
public and the owner only tangentially).
172. See Congress Threatens to Leave D.C., supra note 1 (using such trademarks as
“the Capitol,” “Pac-Bell,” and “C-SPAN” as well the as the names of various
politicians).
173. See Chu, supra note 7 (describing the defensive tone that the editor of the
Chinese news service took when confronted with questions about how the satirical
article worked its way into the newspaper).
174. This is distinguished from infringement actions based on the FTDA, which
imposes liability for the unauthorized borrowing of famous trademarks even if there
is no evidence of confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000); see Cordero, supra note 29,
at 616 (explaining that dilution can occur without a showing of consumer
confusion); Schlosser, supra note 30, at 933–94 (interpreting the FTDA to permit
infringement solely for lessening the capacity of the mark to distinguish between
goods, regardless of a likelihood of consumer confusion).
175. In copyright law the owner of the copyright in question brings suit solely on
his or her behalf to protect an exclusive set of rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)
(listing the rights granted to a copyright holder).
176. Indeed, while there are no constitutional protections guarding against
product confusion, the First Amendment guarantees the right to free speech and
expression. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . .”).
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177

might result in slightly more confusion, it is a small price to pay for
the overdue First Amendment recognition of satire in this context.
C. Famous Trademarks Are Part of Society and Any Comment on Society
Should Be Free to Borrow Those Marks
The second justification for expanding the balancing test
employed by the Second Circuit to include expressive satire relates to
the desire of businesses and individuals who hold trademarks to make
178
their mark famous. Trademark owners thrust their marks into the
national spotlight, and so they should not be surprised when such
179
marks are used in satirical comments that mock society as a whole.
Indeed, as the court in Mattel explained, sometimes there is simply no
other way to identify goods such as aspirin or Rolls-Royce, and so if a
satirist wants to describe those brands while targeting society, he is
180
forced to use their trademarks.
This represents the more general
trend of trademarks being used not to identify a product, but rather
181
to express an idea or point of view, a situation that should trigger
182
To this end, Judge
increased First Amendment protection.
Kozinski has noted that when trademark owners thrust a mark on the
public through “well-orchestrated campaigns intended to burn them
into our collective consciousness,” the owners must then relinquish
control over the trademark as a consequence of seeking such
exposure because the mark has taken on symbolic meaning as part of
183
society at large.
The protection of satirical expression, however, is not derived
solely from the desire of trademark owners to saturate the public
177. See supra text accompanying note 58 (conceding that satirical comments are
potentially more confusing than parodies because they target broad aspects of
society, as opposed to one particular work).
178. See Cantwell, supra note 34, at 555 (declaring that the goal of trademark
owners to have the public readily identify their goods is obvious from the amount of
money invested in cultivating a business’s mark).
179. Id. (arguing that businesses that hold their mark out as an integral part of
society should accept the risk of some form of public ridicule in return).
180. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reasoning that the Sleekcraft test fails to account for situations where there is no
other way to describe a product or mark that, as in the case of Rolls Royce, “has taken
on an expressive meaning apart from its source-identifying function”).
181. See Weitman, supra note 165, at 1695 (asserting that societal trends have
caused trademarks to represent a symbol, “status or fashion” beyond the original
source identifying role).
182. See Denicola, supra note 78, at 207 (“When the trademark is utilized as a
vehicle for the communication of ideas . . . constitutional interests can no longer be
ignored.”).
183. Kozinski, supra note 29, at 975. Judge Kozinski goes on to assert that, after
trademark has become embedded in public discourse, the paramount concern in
any balancing test must be the public’s right to make use of the mark. Id.
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consciousness, because this intent alone does not secure trademark
184
Rather, it is public support and acknowledgment that
protection.
both make a trademark well-known and provide judicial recognition
185
and protection to the mark. In areas of law similar to trademark, in
which legal protection for names and symbols is conditioned upon
186
consumer recognition, commentators have reasoned that, because
the public is the source of power, the public should also be free to
187
use these symbols at will.
The same line of thought can easily be
188
applied to trademark law. Therefore, the public is not only being
protected by trademark law, but is also granting protection to
trademarks. It only follows that the public should then be able to use
189
such marks in expressive satirical comments on society.
184. The only types of trademarks that are given immediate protection are those
that are inherently distinctive. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 11:4 (listing marks
that are “arbitrary and fanciful” (those that are arbitrarily applied to their product or
are simply made up) and suggestive (those that are not merely descriptive and so
require some sort of inference to lead the consumer to the product) as inherently
distinctive); 1 GILSON, supra note 25, § 2.01 (explaining that trademarks that are held
to be fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive receive automatic protection because they are
inherently distinctive). Secondary meaning is required for all other types of
potential trademarks, including those that simply describe their product. 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 11:1.
185. This is especially true of trademarks that are not inherently distinctive and
require the consuming public to endow the mark with secondary meaning. See 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 15:5 (noting that the primary element of secondary
meaning is the consumer association between the otherwise descriptive term and the
particular product, which in turn makes the term a trademark deserving of
protection); 1 GILSON, supra note 25, § 2.09 (finding that a trademark attains
secondary meaning when there becomes an “association in the public mind between
a product and its source”); cf. Jollymore, supra note 119, at 126–27 (asserting that it is
public usage that gives symbolic meaning to names and images of famous celebrities,
which then allows them to be protected by the right of publicity).
186. One example of protection being based on fame is the state law right of
publicity, which protects a celebrity’s image and persona if it has marketable value.
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 22, at 883–84 (explaining that the right of publicity
developed with mass advertising and consumer culture).
187. See Cordero, supra note 29, at 655 (supporting increased protection for the
fair use of cultural icons in both commercial and entertainment purposes because
society has given these symbols their iconic status); Jollymore, supra note 119, at 154
(concluding that when the public recognition of celebrities becomes so high that
they become a symbol, their right of publicity protection should expire and their
persona should become a free part of the public domain).
188. See Schlosser, supra note 30, at 964 (arguing that owners of corporate
trademarks suing under the FTDA should have to prove actual malice because their
mark is akin to a public figure). But see Bryan M. Gallo, Note, Barbie’s Life in Plastic:
It’s Fantastic for First Amendment Protection⎯Or Is It? Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,
295 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2004) (stressing that
labeling a trademark a cultural icon, and thus granting it the qualities of a generic
mark that can be used at will, can unnecessarily weaken trademark rights by finding
fair use every time parody is claimed).
189. Cf. Jollymore, supra note 119, at 130 (reasoning that when the public makes a
celebrity persona a symbol it should become part of the common vocabulary because
“[a] symbol, after all, belongs to all of us.”).
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Finally, when the public recognizes a trademark as famous, the
190
It is often
mark will undoubtedly be used in public discourse.
impossible to make a comment on society without referencing
trademarks, and so satirists necessarily have to use marks that are
191
embedded in our culture in order to successfully express a message.
Similarly, popular culture would be lost without the availability of
192
trademarks to be borrowed for creative expressions.
Even though
many uses of famous marks go unpunished, as recent cases like Dr.
Seuss demonstrate, the public’s right to use its choice of trademarks
when making a satirical comment has not been fully recognized by
193
the courts, even when the defendants are borrowing marks that
194
have become intertwined with our culture.
When a trademark has become so famous that it is used in the
195
public discourse and is a true part of society, the traditional
likelihood of confusion test can no longer be applied to defendants
who use the mark in an expressive satire. If a trademark influences
how we think and speak about the world, then there is simply no
other way to express certain ideas other than via the use of the
196
mark.
Therefore, it would be an unreasonable limitation on free
speech to enjoin the use of a trademark if there is no other way to
190. See Schlosser, supra note 30, at 962 (insisting that some trademarks have
become so intertwined with society that they “have come to symbolize broad social
themes as well as their particular products and corporations”).
191. See Einhorn, supra note 145, at 604 (noting that satirists cannot always find
suitable alternative works for their social criticisms if they are constantly under threat
of suit).
192. For a detailed list of trademarks that have been used in popular culture,
including works such as Kurt Vonnegut Jr.’s “Breakfast of Champions” and Prince’s
“Little Red Corvette” see Judge Kozinski’s dissent in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993).
193. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding that the use of the writing style and trademarks of Dr. Seuss and
“The Cat in the Hat” were not protected because the defendants’ work was a satirical
comment on the O.J. Simpson murder trial).
194. See Brown, supra note 54, at 742 (pointing out that “The Cat in the Hat” is a
part of the cultural heritage of the United States).
195. Cf. Cordero, supra note 29, at 644 (defining a cultural icon as a person or
trademark that has acquired symbolic significance beyond any source-identifying
function). The FTDA states that a famous trademark is one that is “widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A)
(West 2006). The Act goes on to note four factors that can be used to determine
whether a mark has attained the required level of recognition. See id. (listing (1) the
duration, extent, and reach of advertising, (2) the amount, volume, and reach of
sales of products under the mark, (3) the actual recognition of the mark, and
(4) whether the mark is officially registered).
196. See Kozinski, supra note 29, at 974 (“[O]ur vision of the world and of
ourselves is shaped by the words we use and by the images that fill our fantasies. The
words and images of trade are an important part of this panorama.”); supra notes
180–182 and accompanying text (explaining that sometimes the public is forced to
use a trademark to express a particular idea).
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express what the mark itself represents, even where there is risk of
197
confusion. A better approach for free speech would be the natural
expansion of the Second Circuit balancing test to include the
expressive satire of famous marks, a solution that would reward the
public for elevating the stature of a trademark by allowing for a more
198
reasonable approach to fair use.
III. APPLICATION OF AN EXPANDED SECOND CIRCUIT TEST
A reexamination of the four cases cited earlier clearly demonstrates
199
why an expansion of the Second Circuit balancing test to include
protections for the expressive satire of famous trademarks would
result in more vibrant free expression while still protecting against
200
infringement.
The theories and goals of trademark law make it
unique in that courts have the ability to both ensure a stable
marketplace while also allowing for satirical expressions when the
benefit to the public outweighs any potential confusion. Thus, when
confronted with a satirical work that seems destined to be silenced at
the hands of Campbell, courts should be cognizant of the fact that
trademark law aims to protect the public, and if the public will not be
irreparably hurt, then the expression should be allowed.
While each of the cases discussed demonstrates why an expanded
balancing test would appropriately broaden the opportunities for
197. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(identifying the conflict between the First Amendment and trademark rights that
occurs when the mark in question has “enter[ed] our public discourse and become
an integral part of our vocabulary”).
198. Cf. Cantwell, supra note 34, at 583–84 (arguing for the increased protection
of trademark parody because trademark owners are similar to public figures and so
they should expect some amount of ridicule); Schlosser, supra note 30, at 963–64
(declaring that trademark parody must be held to the same First Amendment
standards as criticisms of public figures because both marks and public figures are
involved in contemporary discourse).
199. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing the balancing test developed by the
Second Circuit in Grimaldi and Cliffs Notes).
200. For instance, the use of an existing trademark outside of a parodic or satiric
expression and in direct commercial competition with the senior mark would remain
prohibited. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812–13 (2d Cir.
1999) (rejecting a parody claim because the mark was used solely to promote the
defendant’s motorcycle repair business, which was in direct competition with that of
Harley-Davidson); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337–38 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (finding that the use of the trademark that the plaintiff possessed in his image
on a CD was not expressive because the album did not contain any original works by
the defendant). However, it is possible that the expanded test would result in
increased protection for defendants where previously an injunction would have been
granted. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187, 1191,
1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (prohibiting the sale of a poster with the phrase “Enjoy
Cocaine” written in the famous “Enjoy Coca-Cola” script because there was a
likelihood of confusion, despite the assertion that it was meant to be a satirical
comment).
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201

trademark satire, it is Parks v. LaFace Records that best illustrates why
this expansion is indeed necessary. When Rosa Parks refused to give
up her seat on a bus in 1955 Alabama, it was impossible to predict the
202
eventual ramifications of such a simple act of courage and defiance.
It was also equally impossible to foresee the role that Mrs. Parks
would play in trademark law. By bringing suit against OutKast, Mrs.
Parks provided a perfect example of how trademark infringement
203
suits based on likelihood of confusion has gone awry.
Trademark
204
law, designed to protect the consumer against product confusion,
was used in Parks solely because the plaintiff did not like the use of
205
her name in the title of an expressive work, a far cry from the
206
original goal of trademark infringement litigation.
It could easily be argued that OutKast should have received
protection under the title test established by the Second Circuit in
207
Rogers and Cliffs Notes. However, the extent to which the use of the
mark “Rosa Parks” would be protected is even clearer under an
expanded test. The song Rosa Parks includes not only lyrics that
208
reference the southern part of the United States, but also a
209
harmonica solo in a distinctly Southern style.
Furthermore, it is
201. 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
202. See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE FIFTY MOST INFLUENTIAL WOMEN IN AMERICAN
LAW 169 (1996) (noting that Rosa Parks did not intend to “start a movement” when
she refused to give up her seat, but was just “tired of social injustice”).
203. Indeed, there is evidence in all areas of trademark law of a trend away from
traditional confusion analysis and towards one that favors only the owners of the
mark at the expense of the public. See Denicola, supra note 78, at 159 (observing that
the historic emphasis on deception and confusion in trademark infringement has
begun to be replaced by judicial findings of misappropriation even where no
likelihood of confusion exists); Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark: Brand
Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1959 (2007) (reasoning that recent amendments to the FTDA
are “[i]n synch with the general trend of trademark law moving away from [a] focus
on protecting consumers and towards protection of trademark holders”).
204. See 1 GILSON, supra note 25, § 1.03[3] (writing that one of the primary
purposes of trademark law is consumer protection, and in infringement suits courts
are sensitive to the impact of possible confusion on the consumer).
205. See Shepardson & Menard, supra note 140 (citing the unauthorized use of
Mrs. Parks’ name as the reason for the suit).
206. An example of a more traditional infringement suit occurs when a senior
mark is misappropriated only to promote a product in direct competition with that
trademark. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding infringement when the defendant borrowed the plaintiff’s famous green
Deere logo to promote MTD’s competing line of tractors).
207. See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text (explaining how the title of
the song Rosa Parks could, despite the conclusions of the Sixth Circuit, be seen as
relating to the lyrics of the song and thus be granted protection).
208. The song mentions “A-T-L, Georgia,” a reference to the Georgia roots of Big
Boi and Andre 3000. OUTKAST, supra note 133.
209. Id.; see S.H. Fernando, Jr., Review: OutKast: Aquemini, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 4,
1998, http://www.rollingstone.com/reviews/album/193280/aquemini (noting both
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unquestioned that Rosa Parks was a monumental figure in the history
210
Thus,
of the American South and the struggle for integration.
when the Southern flavor of the song is combined with the titular
reference to Rosa Parks, it becomes easy to see the connection
between Rosa Parks herself and the potential comment that the song
is making on Southern culture and the struggle for Civil Rights.
211
Regardless of the original intent of the artists, the song Rosa Parks
can be understood as an expressive satire that makes light of the
integration movement, or perhaps memorializes it, through modern
music. While the court in Parks purported to use the Second Circuit
212
balancing test, it focused solely on its own limited appreciation of
213
the relationship between the title and the underlying work and gave
214
only a cursory examination of parody or satire.
If the correct
standard of an expanded balancing test had been used, then the song
would have been a protected form of satire because Rosa Parks is an
215
integral part of political discourse
whose likeness should be
permitted to be used because of the public’s interest in satirical
expression.
Parks is not the only instance in which defendants who created
expressive works would have benefited from an expanded balancing
test that adequately protects all forms of satire. As previously
discussed, the court in Dr. Seuss found that the defendants’ work was
a satire, rather than a parody, because it did not directly ridicule the
that the “folksy harmonies of ‘Rosa Parks’ announce OutKast’s distinctive style of
Southern boogie,” as well as the overall Southern feel of the album).
210. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2003) (tracing the
chronology of Rosa Parks’ role in the Civil Rights Movement during the 1950s and
60s, beginning with her refusal to give up her seat to a white passenger on a
Montgomery, Alabama bus).
211. The defendants in Parks admitted only a symbolic use of Parks’ name and did
not raise a parody or satire defense. Id. at 452, 456. However, if the expanded
balancing test protects the public’s interest in free expression, the courts, who are
guardians of the public’s rights in trademark law, should be free to find parody or
satire wherever it may exist. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583
(1994) (inferring a variety of possible meanings from 2 Live Crew’s parody of the
Roy Orbison song “Oh, Pretty Woman”).
212. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 450 (determining that the appropriate method of
analysis is to weigh the public interest in free expression against that of avoiding
consumer confusion).
213. See id. at 452–59 (addressing whether or not the title was relevant to the
underlying work and whether it was misleading to the consuming public).
214. Id. at 456.
215. It is simply easier for OutKast to title the song “Rosa Parks” than “Historical
Female African-American from Montgomery, Alabama Who Refused to Get Up on a
Bus for a White Man.” As Judge Kozinski has noted, when trademarks serve to fill
these kinds of gaps in our language, they should be protected. Kozinski, supra note
29, at 973–74; cf. Schlosser, supra note 30, at 962 (concluding that the FTDA fails to
adequately protect public discourse when it holds defendants liable for using famous
trademarks in public discussions).
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216

style of The Cat in the Hat.
The court applied the traditional
likelihood of confusion test to the satirical work and issued a
217
In quickly running
preliminary injunction against publication.
through an examination of the Sleekcraft factors, the Dr. Seuss court
218
concluded that the senior marks
were famous and that the
infringing marks were very close in similarity and proximity, factors
219
that weighed against the defendants.
Yet, even if conceding that
the defendants’ work was not transformative and would cause
220
confusion, the facts of this case would not only be considered a
protected use of trademarks under an expanded balancing test, but
also serve to demonstrate the difference between the levels of
infringement protection needed in copyright and trademark law.
Dr. Seuss presented copyright issues that the Ninth Circuit was able
to address fairly quickly because the borrowed work was substantially
similar to the original, and therefore, as discussed earlier, there was
221
no valid parody claim under Campbell. However, simply because the
estate of Dr. Seuss had legitimate infringement claims under
copyright does not mean that it should prevail under trademark law,
which should be more forgiving of defendants who borrow famous
marks to comment on society. In performing an expanded balancing
test, a court would first find that the senior trademarks at issue in Dr.
222
Seuss were undoubtedly famous.
Furthermore, the defendants’
work was expressive and not in direct competition with the marks
held by Dr. Seuss Enterprises because it used lewd language not

216. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.
1997). The court also found that “there [was] no effort to create a transformative
work with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’” Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at
578).
217. Id. at 1403–06.
218. The marks in question were “The Cat in the Hat” and the pseudonym “Dr.
Seuss.” Id. at 1404.
219. The defendants used the phrases “Dr. Juice” and “The Cat NOT in the Hat!”
Id.
220. Many commentators have expressed their discontent with the rigid
application of the satire/parody distinction in Dr. Seuss. See, e.g., Eric J. Schwartz &
Matt Williams, Joking Aside: Recent Copyright Cases Reexamine the Distinction Between
Satire and Parody in Determining Fair Use, L.A. LAW, May 2007, at 33, 37 (noting that
some, including Judge Kozinski, have suggested that a new standard should be
imposed for satire and parody in copyright). Others, however, have accepted the
standard and simply argued that the work in Dr. Seuss was indeed a parody. See
Brown, supra note 54, at 740–42 (illustrating the ways in which the defendants poke
fun at the storyline of “The Cat in the Hat” through the use of the Simpson murder
trial).
221. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403.
222. See Brown, supra note 194, at 742 (finding that “The Cat in the Hat” is an
integral part of American culture). The court in Dr. Seuss also admitted that the
marks in question “are widely recognized trademarks.” 109 F.3d at 1404.
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223

appropriate for Dr. Seuss’ typical audience.
This lack of direct
competition would favor free expression because consumers would
not likely be confused by the two works or think that Dr. Seuss was
224
responsible for the defendants’ publication.
Finally, the
defendants’ work could be considered a comment on either society’s
225
obsession with the O.J. Simpson trial or the criminal justice system,
making it a satire commenting on society that is worthy of protection.
Thus, by disregarding the copyright distinction, a court employing an
expanded balancing test could freely hold that the trademarks used
in Dr. Seuss were such a large part of public discourse and created so
little confusion that the interest in free expression outweighed the
need to protect consumers, even though the challenged work was a
satire.
The protection that would be extended to the trademark satirists in
Dr. Seuss under the application of the expanded balancing test would
have also greatly aided the defendant in Elvis. As in Dr. Seuss, the
226
name Elvis Presley is undoubtedly a famous trademark and the use
of his mark was an expressive comment on society, in this case that of
227
America in the 1960s. Thus, this satirical expression would have to
be examined under the expanded balancing test. Conceding that
there might be some confusion as to the actual sponsorship of the
228
restaurant, it seems clear that this would be outweighed by the
public’s right to use the mark in a satirical way. Because the
overriding concern of trademark law is the protection of the public,
the court should have recognized that, when attempting to lampoon
223. While “The Cat in the Hat” is a celebrated children’s book, “The Cat NOT in
the Hat” included phrases such as “One Knife?/Two Knife?/Red Knife/Dead Wife”
and was clearly not intended for a younger reading audience. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at
1401.
224. The Ninth Circuit noted that no actual confusion could be found at the time
of the case due to the injunction that had prevented distribution of the defendants’
book. Id. at 1405.
225. The work in question ends with what the court called a “moral dilemma” and
text that could easily be seen as questioning the result of the Simpson trial: “And
then you have JUSTICE/Or maybe you don’t . . . ‘Cause if the Cat didn’t do
it?/Then who? Then who? . . . Oh my! Oh Me!/The murderer is running free.” Id.
at 1402.
226. See Cordero, supra note 29, at 633 (observing that Elvis has gained even more
fame after his death, and has subsequently transformed from “idol to icon” who is at
the “center of a cultural obsession that ranges from impersonators and sightings, to
candlelight vigils” at Graceland).
227. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998)
(identifying “The Velvet Elvis” restaurant as a comment on the “faddish bars of the
1960s” that did not require the use of Elvis’ marks because it did not target his
celebrity).
228. See id. at 204 (finding that there was some evidence of actual confusion by
consumers who assumed that the restaurant was associated with Elvis Presley and
might have some of his merchandise for sale).
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230

the 1960s, of which Elvis was an integral part, the use of Elvis’
mark should be allowed because Elvis has come to symbolize more
231
Much like it is impossible to discuss
than just a single person.
232
luxury cars without using the Rolls Royce trademark, a restaurant
seeking to specifically mock the rock and roll consumer culture of
the 1960s would be lost without being able to reference Elvis Presley,
and thus the public necessity to use the mark would justify protection
233
for the satire.
Furthermore, the issue in Elvis is similar to that of Parks because
both cases involved a celebrity trying to limit the use of his or her
name and image. While the defendant’s restaurant in Elvis is
arguably different from the song in Parks, the interior decorations of
234
a store can be just as expressive as a painting or other work of art.
Thus, any attempt by Elvis Presley Enterprises to limit the use of Elvis’
name in an expressive work can be seen as a violation of the primary
purpose of trademark law: protection of the consuming public, not
of the mark’s owner. In both Parks and Elvis, the plaintiffs raised the
235
claim of potential and actual confusion, and while this argument is
229. The district court that was overruled in Elvis stated that the defendant was
trying to mock “a time or concept from the sixties—the Las Vegas lounge scene, the
velvet painting craze,” and explained that the Elvis mark was “an integral part” of this
comment. Id. at 200 (citing Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp.
783, 792 (S.D. Tex. 1996)).
230. See Cordero, supra note 29, at 633 (“[Elvis] was the major force behind the
American rock-and-roll movement.”).
231. See Kozinski, supra note 29, at 972–73 (arguing that when a trademark does
more than simply identify a product’s source, “allowing the trademark holder to
restrict their use implicates our collective interest in free and open
communication”); cf. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 580–81, 585 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding that Babe Ruth, who “hardly needs an introduction” has become
synonymous with baseball, and because the “National Pastime” is something that
“belongs to all of us,” there was no infringement when Ruth’s image was used in a
calendar); Jollymore, supra note 119, at 141 (arguing that when a celebrity image
becomes a symbol the right to use his or her name should “pass into the public
domain”).
232. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“How else do you say that something’s ‘the Rolls Royce of its class’?”).
233. The use of the Elvis mark by “The Velvet Elvis” restaurant was not in direct
competition with Elvis Presley Enterprises because no official Elvis restaurants had
been opened at the time “The Velvet Elvis” was operating. Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202–03.
234. The Supreme Court has held that just because there is a commercial nature
to a defendant’s expression does not mean that he or she is barred from using a fair
use defense such as parody or satire. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 584 (1994) (reasoning that if the commerciality of a work acted against fair use,
then for-profit activities such as teaching, scholarship, research, and news reporting
would be subject to infringement litigation). This view seems to contradict an earlier
opinion of the Court, which held that the “fact that a publication was commercial as
opposed to nonprofit is a . . . factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
235. See Parks v. LaFace Records, Inc., 329 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that Rosa Parks alleged that the title of the song “Rosa Parks” leads consumers to
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more persuasive in Elvis because a consumer might reasonably
believe that Elvis’ estate was involved in running a restaurant, Elvis
236
Because the
was not the only target of the defendant’s satire.
restaurant sought to comment on broad elements of the 1960s, Elvis
would presumably not be the only celebrity image displayed, thus
limiting the confusion. Therefore, much like in Parks, whatever
negligible amount of confusion potentially existed in Elvis would be
outweighed by the need for satirists to use a famous celebrity
trademark to comment on the society in which that celebrity
participated.
Finally, while the defendants prevailed in Mattel due to the
237
application of the title aspect of the Second Circuit balancing test,
applying the expanded test would have provided the defendants
additional freedom. Much like Rosa Parks, Elvis Presley, and The Cat
238
in the Hat, Barbie is a famous trademark and cultural icon. Indeed,
Barbie has been used in numerous examples of popular culture
239
beyond the Aqua song at issue in Mattel. It is only reasonable then
that the public be able to comment freely on the Barbie mark that it
240
helped create.
It becomes clear that in an application of the
expanded balancing test, the court would side with the interest in
241
free expression, much as it did in the actual case. However, instead
242
of relying on the Rogers and Cliffs Notes test that serves only to limit
believe that she was affiliated with the group OutKast); Elvis, 141 F.3d at 193
(recognizing that the plaintiff claimed that there was a likelihood of confusion
between its marks and those used by the defendant).
236. Even the Fifth Circuit, in ruling against the defendant, held that the
restaurant was a “parody of the faddish bars of the sixties” and not limited to Elvis
alone. Elvis, 141 F.3d at 200.
237. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (finding that the title “Barbie Girl” referenced the
underlying song, and that the song was protected because it parodied the Barbie
mark in a way consistent with the Campbell distinction).
238. See id. at 898 (noting that Barbie is a public figure who has been “labeled
both the ideal American woman and a bimbo”).
239. See DAVID BOWIE, Young Americans, on YOUNG AMERICANS (RCA Records 1975)
(using the lines “Well, it ain’t that Barbie doll/Her heart’s been broken just like you
have” in a song referencing teenage sex, pregnancy, guns, and pimps); JOHN HIATT,
The Wreck of the Barbie Ferrari, on PERFECTLY GOOD GUITAR (A&M Records 1993)
(describing the domestic disaster that is the life of Ken and Barbie using lyrics such
as “They look like a family but they’re really not at all,” “As he loaded the chamber,
her eyes got starry/It ain’t the end of the world/It’s just the wreck of the Barbie
Ferrari,” and “He finds them huddled by the toy box and splatters ‘em all”)..
240. This is inferred by the court in Mattel. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (“Once
imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our language
and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”); see also Gallo, supra note
188, at 417 (interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s decision as concluding that the public
should be able to “enjoy the ability to comment on the trademark that it has helped
to attain greatness”).
241. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
242. See id. (accepting the Second Circuit’s test in Rogers as controlling and
holding that the title “Barbie Girl” is relevant to the underlying work).
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the possible protections of trademark satire, the court should have
243
followed its prior reasoning to its logical conclusion and found that
the work was allowed because it was an expressive comment on
244
Barbie and the society that she represents. Finally, while the court
in Mattel did not feel the need to address the likelihood of confusion
245
test, it is unlikely that there would be such a vast amount of
consumer confusion that the court would decline to protect the
246
public’s right to free expression in any such balance.
CONCLUSION
Satire is an expressive tool that writers and artists have used since
247
the time of ancient Athens to create works that do everything from
248
249
entertain to cause the downfall of powerful politicians. There are
250
many tangible benefits that flow from the power of satirical works
243. See id. at 900 (“[T]he trademark owner does not have the right to control
public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its
source-identifying function.”).
244. The court did find that the song directly targeted Barbie, and thus was a
parody. Id. at 901. However, Barbie has come to represent so many things to so
many people that any comment on her can also be seen as a statement about society
in general. See Tamar Buchakjian, Comment, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.: Let’s
Party in Barbie’s World—Expanding the First Amendment Right to Musical Parody of Cultural
Icons, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2003) (concluding that Barbie’s popularity
and overtly feminine figure have made her “celebrated as the prototypical woman
and simultaneously blamed for creating unrealistic expectations of women”); Gallo,
supra note 188, at 421 (noting the many meanings that the Barbie symbol has held
and that she can be used to “describe[] a class of attributes referencing modern
womanhood”).
245. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (reasoning that the traditional Sleekcraft likelihood
of confusion test does not apply to cases where a mark has achieved an expressive
meaning distinct from its original source-identifying function).
246. See id. at 902 (holding that the title “Barbie Girl” does not mislead the
consumer, nor does the album suggest any association with Mattel). One glance at
the lyrics of the song confirms that the average consumer would not think phrases
such as “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in the fantasy world/Dress me up, make it tight, I’m
your dolly” and “Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky/You can touch, you can
play if you say ‘I’m always yours,’/oh ooh” in connection with a Barbie doll would
have originated with Mattel. AQUA, supra note 125.
247. Perhaps the best example of an ancient satirist is the comic poet
Aristophanes, whose play Ecclesiazusae (Assemblywomen) used a humorous plot
regarding a female take-over of the city to comment on the politics of the time.
ARISTOPHANES, Assemblywomen, in THREE PLAYS BY ARISTOPHANES 143 (Jeffrey
Henderson, trans. & ed., Routledge 1996). See generally JOSIAH OBER, POLITICAL
DISSENT IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: INTELLECTUAL CRITICS OF POPULAR RULE 122–55
(1998) (discussing the dual comic and political nature of the play).
248. See Dorsen, supra note 12, at 923 (listing Shakespeare, Orwell, Woody Allen,
and the writers of Mad Magazine as leading satirists).
249. Indeed, the cartoons of Thomas Nast are largely credited with leading to the
demise of New York City’s Boss Tweed and the Tammany Hall political machine of
the second half of the 1800s. Id. at 925 n.9.
250. See Mastrullo, supra note 166, at 1311 (reasoning that, while humor is often
not intended to be taken seriously, it can also carry the “sting of criticism and
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that make it in the best interest of society to have such expressions be
251
This is especially true in trademark law,
protected by the courts.
where it is the job of the judicial system to act on behalf of the public
in a traditional likelihood of confusion trademark action. Simple
ownership of a trademark cannot serve as a monopoly over the use of
a word, symbol, or image, especially after public recognition and
corporate marketing have made it a part of our national discourse.
Under the current standard in trademark law that relies on
doctrine borrowed from copyright, many potential satirists could be
deterred from using trademarks in their work out of fear of being
sued. This not only creates an undesirable amount of uncertainty
regarding potential litigation, but also silences free speech in the
marketplace of ideas. When the Supreme Court endorsed the
parody/satire distinction it was speaking only for copyright law, an
area where authors need increased protection for their original works
because of the creative nature of the speech. A trademark owner
does not need these added protections because his or her mark was
established primarily for public benefit, and so creativity and artistic
integrity, while certainly important, are not the overriding concerns
of the courts. Rather, when examining a trademark infringement
case that deals with a claim of parody or satire, courts should look no
further than a simple balance of the desire to avoid confusion with
that of the need for free expression.
The fact that courts have begun to employ such a test when
examining parody shows that a foundation for the protection of
trademark satire is firmly in place. However, the Second Circuit
balancing test does not go far enough because it is limited to titles
and parodies in a way that leaves satire excluded from the security of
First Amendment protection. The differences between the goals,
protections, and types of speech involved in copyright and trademark
law, when combined with the fact that famous trademarks have
become a part of the national culture and public domain, justify
granting the creative use of trademarks more protection than those
that borrow copyrighted material. Indeed, it would only take a small
step for a court to embrace trademark satire as worthy of
constitutional protection, and all that is needed is the initiative that

embarrassment from ridicule” that sometimes goes as far as to evoke “outrage and
indignation instead of amusement and laughter”).
251. See Einhorn, supra note 145, at 603 (contending that the “gains to the general
public from satire . . . seem greater than in parody” because it uses recognized
symbols to “ridicule or criticize political institutions, cultural values, or media
presentations”).

2008]

BIG BOI, BARBIE, DR. SEUSS, AND THE KING

681

allows satire to take its natural position alongside parody as a valued
form of First Amendment expression.

